ABSTRACT To achieve source authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation, a number of authentication protocols adopt several types of digital signatures: public-key signatures, identity-based signatures, and certificateless signatures. In this paper, we show that an anonymous remote authentication scheme for wireless body area network, an anonymous handover authentication scheme, an authentication scheme for emergency mobile cyber-physical system, and an authenticated key agreement protocol based on the three types of signatures schemes are insecure against various impersonation attacks due to insecurity of the underlying signature schemes. These results show that using cryptographic primitives without security proofs causes serious security vulnerabilities on the security protocol itself. Our results give strong evidences that the security of adopted cryptographic primitives should be proved in appropriate formal security models as well as proof of the security protocol itself.
I. INTRODUCTION
To achieve message integrity, non-repudiation and source authentication, a number of authentication protocols adopt several types of digital signatures: public-key signatures, identity-based signatures and certificateless signatures. A public-key signature scheme needs to authenticate users' public keys which consist of random strings. To use publickey signatures securely, it needs Public-key infrastructure (PKI) for the authentication of public keys. PKI makes it possible to authenticate public keys binding users' identities with public-key certificates that are issued, managed and revoked by a Certificate Authority (CA). The public-key certificates consist of a user's public key and a CA's signature of the public key. There are several problems of certificate managements in PKI including storage, distribution and additional computational overhead for verifying CA's signatures.
Identity (ID)-based infrastructure [33] does not use the public-key certificates making a user's public key easily computable from the user's known identity information like a cellular phone number or an email address. Such cryptosystems solve the PKI problems related to certificate management. Private Key Generator (PKG) or Key Generation Center (KGC) is responsible for the generation of all users' private keys corresponding to identities unlike conventional publickey cryptosystems. This causes the key-escrow problem, in other words, PKG knows all the private keys of users, thus PKG can forge any signatures on any message and decrypt any ciphertexts for any users.
At Asiacrypt'03, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] proposed the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) to provide a solution to the key-escrow problem in the ID-based systems. CL-PKC uses a user's full private key which is generated from both some contributions of PKG (called a partial private key) and secret information chosen by the user. Thus, an additional user public key is transmitted together with a ciphertext or a signature. The user public key does not need to be authenticated by any trusted authority such as CA. Consequently, it needs to get both the user's identity and its corresponding public key to verify a signature and encrypt a message.
To achieve source authentication and non-repudiation, a number of authentication protocols and privacy-preserving protocols for secure communications in various environments adopted these three types signature schemes. In particular, certificateless signature (CLS) schemes without using publickey certificates seem to be suitable for achieving authenticity in IoT environments including Drone-Based Smart City Applications [31] , Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks [14] , Vehicular Sensor Networks [20] , Industrial IoT (IIoT) [22] , IoTBased Mobile Payments [37] and cyber-physical system (CPS) [35] . Recently, Yuan and Wang [38] proposed a new CLS scheme provably secure in the standard model. Liu et al. [23] and Xu et al. [35] adopted the CLS schemes for anonymous remote authentication for Wireless Body Area Networks's and CPS, respectively. He et al. [18] adopted a pseudonym-based signature scheme using ID-based signatures. Guo et al. [15] proposed an authenticated key agreement scheme based on both signatures and users' passwords for mobile client-server environments. In this paper, we show that the five authentication protocols proposed in [15] , [18] , [23] , [35] , and [38] are entirely broken by impersonation attacks due to vulnerabilities of the underlying signature algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. From Section II to Section VI, we describe five authentication protocols proposed in [15] , [18] , [23] , [35] , and [38] . We then show that the underlying signature schemes are insecure against various forgery attacks, so the protocols are insecure against impersonation attacks. We discuss formal security proofs of the adopted cryptographic primitives to security protocols, and the security protocols themselves in conclusion.
II. YUAN AND WANG'S CLS SCHEME
We describe Yuan and Wang's CLS scheme [38] secure without random oracles.
A. DESCRIPTION OF YUAN AND WANG'S CLS SCHEME
Yuan-Wang's CLS scheme comprises six algorithms as follows:
• Setup. Given a security parameter k, a bilinear map e :
G × G → G T with two cyclic groups of a prime order p, G and G T .
-Select a random number s ∈ Z * p , a generator g of G 1 , and compute
, f > and the master secret key as msk = g s 2 .
• Partial-secret-key-extract. For an identity ID, KGC (Key Generation Center) calculates H 0 (ID). Let u[i] be the i-th bit of u = H 0 (ID) and
as the partial secret key of the user with the identity ID.
• Set-user-key. A user picks a random x ID ∈ Z * p and calculates its public key
• Private-key-extract. A user with ID selects a random r u ∈ Z * p and calculates its full private key using its partial secret key psk ID and secret value x ID as sk ID = (psk
= (sk ID,1 , sk ID,2 ).
• Sign. For a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , a signer with ID selects a random r m ∈ Z * p , calculates b = f (sk ID,2 ) and h = H (m, ID, upk ID , sk ID,2 , g r m , m b , ν). Then, using the full private key sk ID , the signer generates a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) as
• Verify. Given a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) of a message m for a signer's identity ID and the public key upk ID , the verifier does the following procedures.
-Check whether e(upk ID,1 , upk ID,2 ) = e(g 1 , ν) holds or not. If it is not hold, then abort it.
-Check whether
holds or not. If this holds, then accept the signature, otherwise, reject it.
B. FORGERY ATTACKS ON YUAN AND WANG'S CLS SCHEME
Unlike ID-based signature schemes and public-key signature schemes, CLS schemes have two types of adversaries [3] , [4] , [21] , [36] : a type I adversary is a malicious third party who has ability to replace users' public keys and a type II adversary is a dishonest KGC who knows the master secret and cannot replace users' public keys. The type I adversary focuses on the security caused by the uncertified property of a user public key, while the type II adversary is related to the security derived from the disclosure of the master secret of KGC. Thus, the security against two types of adversaries guarantees that it is not possible to forge valid signatures despite both the uncertified user public key and the disclosure of the master secret • First, in the Setup phase, a malicious KGC chooses random numbers β 0 , β 1 ∈ Z * p and computes m 0 = g β 0 and m 1 = g β 1 . Then, the KGC publishes the public param-
• Suppose that the KGC has a valid signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) on a message m for {ID, upk ID }, where
• From σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), the KGC can forge any certificateless signature of any message m = m for {upk ID , ID} as follows; -The KGC computes b = f (σ 2 ), in fact, for the given identity ID, varying messages, the value b is invariant since
of a message m as
The KGC who knows the value β b can get m
is a valid certificateless signature of the message m for {ID, upk ID } as it satisfies the verification equation:
Yuan and Wang [38] claimed that anyone cannot compute upk r m ID,2 from the signer's public key upk ID,2 and σ 3 = g r m due to the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Our attack shows that, without computing upk r m ID,2 , KGC can forge certificateless signatures on any message m = m for {ID, upk ID } from a certificateless signature on only a message m by choosing the parameters m 0 and m 1 maliciously. The above attacks illustrate how the maliciousbut-passive KGC controls the system-wide parameters to forge certificateless signatures. In reality, KGC can generate the master public/secret key pair specifically so that the KGC forges any signature on behalf of the victim. Thus, a secure certificateless scheme must be guaranteed security against the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks.
III. LIU ET AL.'S AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Wireless body area network is one of the promising wireless sensor technologies for improving healthcare services, owing to connectivity between independent sensors and its capability of continuously and seamlessly exchanging medical information in real time. However, the lack of privacy-protection in this new networking paradigm would cause the leakage of private information to malicious adversaries through unauthenticated manners. To solve the privacy-issue, Liu et al. [23] proposed anonymous authentication protocols using a new certificateless signature (CLS) scheme, which is proved existential unforgeability against an adaptive chosen-message attack in the random oracle model under the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem, i.e., they proved unforgeability of their CLS scheme against type II adversaries which mount forgery attacks with the help of PKG. They then constructed two remote anonymous authentication protocols based on the CLS scheme for resource-constrained mobile clients. To access WBAN services without the potential privacy leakage to application providers (APs) and network managers (NMs), they use an anonymous account index instead of a client's real identity. Here, we present impersonation attacks by type I adversaries on Liu et al.'s anonymous authentication schemes owing to the vulnerabilities of the underlying CLS scheme.
A. DESCRIPTION OF LIU ET AL.'S CLS SCHEME

Liu et al.'s scheme comprises six algorithms as follows:
• Setup: A security parameter l is given. Choose (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) as cyclic groups of prime order q > 2 l .
-Choose P a generator of G 1 and a bilinear map e :
-PKG selects a random number s PKG ∈ Z * q , as a master secret key, and computes Q PKG = s PKG P, as a mater public key.
-PKG publishes the system parameter,< l,G 1 , G 2 , q, P, e, H, h, Q PKG > and a master secret s PKG is kept secret.
• Set-Partial-Private-Key: A signer chooses a random number s 1 ∈ Z * q , as its partial secret key.
• Set-Partial-Public-Key: A signer generates Q 1 = s 1 P as its public key.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: From a user's identity, id, PKG computes S 2 = s PKG Q 2 as a partial private key of id, where Q 2 = H (id, Q 1 ). It is distributed to the signer in a secret channel. Then the user's public key is id, Q 1 and the user's private key is s 1 , S 2 .
• CL-Sign: To sign a message m, a signer picks a random number k ∈ Z * q and calculates
• CL-Verify: Given a message m and its signature, (v, U ), a verifier calculates Q 2 = H (id, Q 1 ), and accepts the signature if it satisfies the following verification equation
B. FORGERY ATTACKS ON LIU ET AL.'S SCHEME
A type I adversary who does not know the master secret key can replace users' public keys. Now, we show that Liu et al.'s scheme is insecure against the type I adversaries, who can forge a user's certificateless signatures on any message under the replaced public keys at any time. Key Replacement Attack I. Let A I be a type I adversary and id be a user's identity. The adversary A I wants to forge a CLS of a message m for id.
• First, A I replaces the user's public key Q 1 = s 1 P with Q 1 = s 1 P corresponding to id, for its choice s 1 ∈ Z * q .
• Next, A I obtains a CLS (v, U ) on a message m for id, where
via CL-Sign oracle. Then A I obtains kS 2 by computing U − vs 1 Q 2 . In adversarial model of type I adversaries, the adversaries can access the CL-Sign oracle for the replaced public keys [36] .
• Finally, A I which knows (s 1 , r, kS 2 ) can forge a CLS (v , U ) on any message m for {Q 1 , id} as
where Q 2 = H (id, Q 1 ) and
it satisfies the following verification equation
• Consequently, A I can forge CLSs on any messages for any users by replacing the users' public keys without the knowledge of the partial private key S 2 of id. The scheme is also insecure against an another key replacement attack by type I adversaries without requesting to CL-Sign oracle.
Key Replacement Attack II. Suppose that a type I adversary A I attempts to forge a CLS of a message m for a user with id.
is a valid CLS on any message m for {Q 1 , id}: it satisfies the following verification equation
• Finally, A I can forge CLSs of any messages for any users by replacing the users' public keys without using the partial private key S 2 of id and without requesting to CL-Sign oracle. Consequently, their authentication protocols based on the CLS scheme are insecure against impersonation attacks: type I adversaries can impersonate any client to the AP, since they can forge CLSs on any messages for any identities in the underlying CLS scheme.
IV. XU ET AL.'S MCCLS SCHEME
Xu et al. [35] proposed CLS scheme, so-called McCLS, secure in the random oracle model under the hardness Computational Diffie-Hellman problem for secure mobile wireless cyber-physical systems. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) integrate monitoring, communication and computing capabilities, and constantly interacts with physical environments. In CPS, it needs to solve the connectivity problems with self-organizing and self-configurable characteristics. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) can provide a solution to the connectivity problem. Xu et al. provided an empirical study to compare the Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing algorithm based on the combination of their McCLS scheme (McDV) with the traditional AODV in terms of efficiency and effectiveness against two common attacks, a rushing attack and a redirection attack utilizing QualNet simulation software [30] . Here, we show that the McCLS scheme is totally broken: anyone who can obtain certificateless signatures for an identity can forge certificateless signatures on any messages for the identity.
A. DESCRIPTION OF XU ET AL.'S MCCLS SCHEME The McCLS scheme is specified five algorithms as follows.
• • Generate Key Pair. A user chooses a secret random number x ∈ R Z * p , and computes P ID = xP pub . It sets the user's public/private key pair as (P ID , S ID ) = (xP pub , x).
• Sign. From a user's full private key (D ID , S ID ) and a message M , choose a random r ∈ Z * p and output a signature σ = (V , S, R), where
• Verify. From a signature σ = (V , S, R) on a message M for an identity ID and a public key P ID , calculate h = H 2 (M , R, P ID ) and check whether
holds or not. If it holds, accept it. Otherwise, reject it.
B. FORGERY ATTACKS ON XU ET AL.'S MCCLS SCHEME
We show that the McCLS scheme is universal forgeable, i.e., anyone can forge CLSs on any messages for any users.
Universal Forgery of the McCLS Scheme.
• Suppose that an adversary A who has obtained a valid CLS σ = (R, S, V ) of a message M for {P ID = xP pub , ID}, where
Then A can forge σ = (R , S , V ) of a message M as follows;
Then σ = (R , S , V ) is a valid CLS on M for {ID, P ID } as it satisfies the verification equation
In this attack, anyone who can access the Signing oracle for {ID, P ID } of the McCLS scheme can forge a CLS on any message for {ID, P ID }, of course, the message has never requested to the Signing oracle for {ID, P ID }. This result shows that anyone who knows neither a master secret key nor the secret key of a user public key can forge CLSs on any messages. Therefore, the scheme is totally broken, so their AODV routing algorithm using the McCLS scheme is also insecure against impersonation attacks.
V. HE ET AL.'S HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Mobile networks allow mobile nodes such as smart phone, Laptop PC and vehicle to roam securely and seamlessly over multiple access points via handover authentication protocols. A handover authentication scenario consists of three parties: the authentication server (AS), access points (APs) and mobile nodes (MNs). After registering to AS, an MN connects to any AP to access its subscribed services. The handover authentication should be conducted at AP 2 , when the MN moves from the current AP, AP 1 to a new AP, AP 2 . Then, via the handover authentication, AP 2 authenticates the MN and rejects any access requests from unauthorized users. For secure data exchange over the connection subsequently, AP 2 and the MN should establish a secret session key. Seamless handover over multiple access points is very desirable to mobile nodes, but guaranteeing its efficiency and security is challenging. He et al. [17] proposed an anonymous handover authentication protocol, PairHand, using their pseudo-IDbased signature scheme based on bilinear maps. However, PairHand is entirely broken because mobile nodes' private keys can be recovered by anyone from a message transmitted via just eavesdropping, so anyone can impersonate legitimate nodes to access points. Subsequently, He et al. [18] proposed its improved version based on bilinear pairing defined over the groups of a composite order to remedy this weakness. Here, we show that their improved protocol is still entirely broken due to the same reason of the original scheme. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF HE ET AL.'S AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
B. FORGERY ATTACKS ON THE IMPROVED PAIRHAND
To overcome the weakness of the original protocol, PairHand, He et al. [18] utilized the bilinear map defined on the groups of a composite order in [8] instead of the group of a prime order. However, it seems that the authors confuse their scheme with RSA [29] . In RSA, the operations are performed in the group of Z * n , where n = p · q is a composite number, and p and q are two large prime numbers. Although n is publicly known, it is hard to find the order of the multiplicative group without the knowledge of p and q because its order is computed by φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). More precisely, if |n| ≥ 1024 bits, it is infeasible within current computational capabilities due to the intractability of the integer factorization problem (IFP). Due to the hardness of this problem, given e, it is difficult to find d such that (e, d) = 1: RSA's encryption and decryption are performed as C = m e and m = (C) d , where m is a message and
However, in the setting of their improved scheme, the order of the group G is exactly q = q 1 q 2 , where q is a composite number and q 1 or q 2 are large prime numbers. Thus, anyone can compute H (m) −1 mod q from H (m) using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm without knowing of the prime factors of q if gcd(H (m), n) = 1. If H (m) is not relatively prime to q then it means that q 1 or q 2 is a prime factor of H (m), i.e., the IFP is solved. If |n| ≥ 1024 bits, the probability that occurs such an event is negligible. Therefore, anyone can compute H (m) −1 mod q from H (m) with a high probability and anyone can recover a related private key from only a signature, i.e., it is universally forgeable.
• First, an adversary A obtains {M i , σ i } by eavesdropping on a connection between MN i and AP 2 . Then A can recover MN i 's private key sH 1 (pid i ) by computing
Simultaneously, A can calculate the shared symmetric key
between MN i and AP 2 . Obviously, A can compute all of the private keys associated to all pseudo-IDs and thus the shared secret key with all APs by merely eavesdropping. Finally, A who knows sH 1 (pid i ), can decrypt all ciphertexts encrypted under K i−2 between MN i and AP 2 .
• Later, A with the private key sH 1 (pid i ), can always impersonate the legal mobile node MN i to AP 2 within the ExpiryDate i included in pid i . When AP 2 sends {M i , σ i } (which is generated from A impersonating MN i ) to the AS, the AS comes to find the real identity of MN i (not A), as its signature verification always holds. Therefore, the improved PairHand is still entirely broken. VOLUME 6, 2018
VI. GUO ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
The password authentication problem is that two parties who only have the same password authenticate each other and establish a secret session key between two parties being used for the protection of their subsequent communications via an insecure network. One of solution to this problem is to use a password-based authenticated key agreement (PAKA) protocol. The first PAKA protocol, Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE), was proposed by Bellovin and Merritt [6] . Based on both symmetric-key and public-key cryptosystem, EKE is secure against dictionary attacks by a passive attacker to check guessed passwords from publicly available information. To overcome plaintext-equivalence, verifier-based password authentication protocols have been presented. A typical one is the Augmented EKE(A-EKE) [7] , a verifier-based version of EKE. Since then, many PAKA protocols have been developed [1] , [2] , [5] , [9] , [10] , [26] . However, most of these PAKA protocols are not suitable for mobile wireless communications owing to power consumption, the constraints on bandwidth and storage requirements in mobile devices.
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), one of public-key cryptosystem, provides higher computational efficiency and smaller key sizes than RSA at the same security level: ECC-160 (resp., ECC 224) achieves security the same as RSA-1024 (resp., RSA-2048). In particular, its small key sizes facilitate potential reductions in processing bandwidth, energy, power and memory. Therefore, it is believed that cryptographic protocols using ECC rather than RSA are adequate for resource-constrained environment, so have received more and more attention on its deployment to the mobile devices. Although several PAKA protocols based on ECC and their improved protocols have been proposed [16] , [24] , [25] , [28] , [32] , [34] . However, the protocols are insecure against off-line password-guessing attacks [16] , [24] , [25] , [28] . Also, none of these protocols provide a formal security analysis. Recently, Guo et al. [15] presented a PAKA protocol combining signatures based on ECC with a user's password for mobile client-server environment. They provided a formal security analysis of their protocol under the hardness of the weak version of Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (w-ECDDH) in the random oracle model. They then investigated the suitability of their protocol for 3GPP2 specifications [12] , [13] and improved the A-Key (authenticated key) distribution for current mobile cellular systems. Here, we show that Guo et al.'s protocol is still insecure against off-line password guessing attacks.
A. DESCRIPTION OF GUO ET AL.'S Protocol
We use the following notations. Notations.
• F : a finite field with q elements • E : an elliptic curve defined on F .
• n : a large prime.
• G : a cyclic group of the order n.
• P, Q : two points in G with a large order n.
• D : a uniformly distributed dictionary with size |D|.
• S : a low-entropy password randomly chosen from D shared between Alice and Bob.
• t : a value derived from the password S in a predetermined way uniformly distributed in Z * n .
• H 1 : a cryptographic hash function.
• H 2 :{0,1} * → {0,1} n , a key derivation function.
and sends < Q A1 , Q A2 > to a server B.
2) The server B also selects two random
A Q B1 +d A Q B2 and verifies whether the equation In [15] , they proved that their protocol is secure if the w-ECDDH assumption holds handling the hash function as a random oracle, where w-ECDDH assumption is defined as: for a ∈ Z * q and P, R ∈ G, differentiating (P, a 2 P, R) and (P, a 2 P, a 3 P) is hard.
B. CRYPTANALYSIS OF GUO ET AL.'S PAKA PROTOCOL
Password guessing attacks can be divided into three classes as follows [11] :
• Detectable On-line Password Guessing Attacks. An adversary tires to utilize a guessed password in an online transaction. It can verify the correctness of the guessed password from the response of a server S. A failed guessing password can be detected by the server.
• Undetectable On-line Password Guessing Attacks. An adversary attempts to verify a guessed password in an on-line transaction, while a failed guessing password cannot be detected by S, since S cannot distinguish between an honest request and a malicious one.
• Off-line Password Guessing Attacks. 
as in (2) and sends < Q A1 , Q A2 > to the server B impersonating A.
• On the receipt of (Q A1 , Q A2 ), the server B selects two random numbers
• After intercepting the message < H B , Q B1 , Q B2 >, A can get A's password by performing off-line password guessing attacks as: 
Here, Q B2 = d B2 Y = d B2 (aP − tP) = (a − t)d B2 P, so we can obtain d B2 P = (a − t) −1 Q B2 .
• Finally, A recovers A's password t from algebraic relationships among known values, so it can always impersonate the legitimate client A. Its weakness against the above attacks is thanks to the lack of a step to check A's possession of t.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the three CLS schemes in [23] , [36] , and [39], one pseudo-ID-based signature scheme in [18] and one public-key signature scheme in [15] are insecure against various forgery attacks. Then we have shown that the five authentication protocols [15] , [18] , [23] , [35] , [38] using these five signature schemes are entirely broken since the adversaries can impersonate any legitimate users to other parties due to the insecurity of their underlying signature schemes. The insecurity of their underlying signature schemes means that the authentication protocols based on the signature schemes cannot achieve integrity, non-repudiation and source authentication. Our results show that the use of such an insecure signature schemes causes serious security failures on the authentication protocols themselves.
Some of the five signature schemes have been proved their unforgeability in formal security models. Yuan and Wang [38] proved its existential unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks without random oracles under the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Liu et al. [23] proved unforgeability of their CLS scheme against only type II adversaries which attempt to forge a valid signature with the help of PKG, under the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model without proving unforgeability against type I adversaries. In the case of Guo et al.'s PAKA protocol, they provided the formal security proof of their protocol under the hardness of mathematical hard problem, w-ECDDH. In other words, the security of Guo et al.'s PAKA protocol itself relies upon the hardness of the w-ECDDH problem. Our forgery attacks on the these schemes don't mean that an instance of their underlying hard problems, the computational Diffie-Hellman and w-ECDDH problem, can be solved. It shows that either their security proofs are flawed or their formal security models don't cover forgery attacks by various types of adversaries correctly. Our attacks are due to algebraic relations among the transmitted messages defined in the underlying groups. In fact, their security models may not cover various attacks owing to algebraic relations between transmitted messages computed in the underlying group. Thus, security of authentication protocols as well as cryptographic primitives adopted to the security protocols should be proved in appropriate formal security models. The security models for the authentication protocols should contain granular security to modulate the possibility of potential algebraic attacks.
